As ESG practices shift from “voluntary disclosure” to “regulatory compliance,” companies are facing dual pressures from stakeholder demands for strict ESG transparency and short-term profit driven motivations. This article aims to explore the causes of corporate greenwashing and provide theoretical support for research on greenwashing governance. Firstly, based on the resource-based theory, ESG information disclosure is regarded as a strategic resource acquisition behavior, and a two-way fixed effects econometric model is constructed. Secondly, this article also examines the impact of strategic differences on greenwashing behavior under different market environments, enterprise sizes, property rights, regional distributions, and industry types through heterogeneity analysis. Research has found that significant differences in corporate strategy positively drive greenwashing behavior, and this association remains robust even after controlling for municipalities, fixed industries, and lagged variables. Heterogeneity testing shows that strategic heterogeneity has a more significant impact on greenwashing behavior in samples of high market competition, large-scale, non-state-owned property structure, east-west regional distribution, and manufacturing enterprises. In addition, the increase in media attention amplifies the correlation between strategic heterogeneity and greenwashing behavior, and has a significant positive moderating effect.