By constructing Hotelling spatial competition models, this study examines how online car-hailing platforms with different open participation models should formulate pricing strategies under varying supply and demand conditions, and analyzes the impact of fees charged to drivers by the platform-on-platform profit under different models. The results indicate that when the supply of ride-hailing services exceeds demand, the platform can achieve greater revenue by adopting a partially open strategy. Conversely, when the market is supply-constrained, the platform can achieve greater revenue by adopting a completely closed strategy. The revenue of online car-hailing platforms adopting different open models is influenced by the cross-group network effects between passengers and drivers. When cross-group network effects are high, the maximum revenue of platforms adopting a complete open modell decreases as the platform’s platform commission percentage increases when the ride-hailing market is in short supply, and increases as the platform commission percentage increases when supply exceeds demand. The maximum revenue of platforms adopting a full-closed modell decreases as the vehicle leasing costs for platform-owned vehicles increase. For platforms adopting a partially open model, the maximum revenue should prioritize assigning orders to self-operated vehicle drivers when supply exceeds demand. Based on the above conclusions, relevant recommendations are proposed for online car-hailing platforms, aiming to provide theoretical guidance for adjusting operational strategies.
