Due to the limitations of economic structure and social level development, it is difficult to carry out the work of withdrawing from homesteads in traditional agricultural areas because of the weak willingness of farmers to withdraw on a large scale. Based on the survey data of 25 townships in S County in traditional agricultural areas, this paper proposes 15 explanatory variables from four levels: personal and family characteristics, homestead characteristics, risk expectations, and expectations of security and compensation. Combined with the results of logistic regression analysis, we initially identified 13 variables that have a significant impact on farmers’ willingness to withdraw from homesteads, and summarized the main dilemmas faced by the withdrawal of homesteads in traditional agricultural areas. Taking the government policy and the willingness to withdraw from homesteads as the game subjects, a two-party evolutionary game model of local government-farmers is constructed based on the interest orientation of the two. Setting up the evolutionary game simulation experiments with different influencing factors, analyzing the decision-making orientation and game stability of the game subjects, in which the government’s decision not to withdraw from the farmer’s decision to punish the strength or compensation for the farmer’s withdrawal of the strength of the largest, are able to produce the probability of the farmer choosing not to withdraw from the strategy of the effect of converging to 0, and respectively, in the 60, 15 units of time to begin to stabilize. Accordingly, the government should design a positive incentive mechanism with rich economic compensation content and high compensation level, and a negative incentive mechanism based on economic pressure, both of which work in tandem to promote the willingness of traditional farmland residents to withdraw from homesteads.
