This paper conducts an in-depth discussion on legal issues concerning personal information protection in data transactions. First, a three-party evolutionary game model is constructed, setting parameters such as regulatory costs and violation benefits. By replicating dynamic equations, the study analyzes the factors influencing each party’s strategy selection and the stability of equilibrium. It defines the dual attributes of personal information rights and examines the legal conflict between circulation efficiency and strict protection in data transactions. Based on game simulations and conflict analysis, the paper proposes an optimization path for legal mechanisms protecting personal information. When sR4 + vR4 + (1-β)θR4 – β(F + I) – C2 < 0, (r1 – 11 + r2 – 12)R2 + L – β(1 – C3) – C1 > 0, and R4 + vR4 + 0R4 – C2 > 0, the value of x exhibits an initial increasing trend from the starting point, followed by a decreasing trend. While the y-value continuously decreases, both converging to the stable game point (0, 0). When sR4 + vR4 + (1 – β)θR4 – β(F + I) – C2 < 0, (r1 – l1 + r2 – l2)R2 + L – β(I – C3) – C1 > 0, and sR4 + vR4 + θR4 – C2 < 0, starting from the initial point, the x-value first exhibits a rapid increasing trend followed by a rapid decreasing trend, while the y-value continuously decreases, both converging toward the stable game point (0, 0). The level of government regulatory costs and the level of public awareness and ability to reasonably utilize tools like agreements to protect information security not only influence the evolution of one’s own strategy but also affect the strategy evolution trends of other stakeholders.
