Under the condition of parallel promotion of “double carbon” target, new power system construction and high proportion of renewable energy access, dual environmental policies and intermittent constraints jointly change the investment boundary and price transmission mechanism of the power supply chain. This paper builds a two-level power supply chain model composed of a single power producer and a single electricity seller. Under the combined effect of carbon cap-and-trade mechanism, renewable energy quota system and intermittent shocks, four scenarios are set up: power producer leading non-cooperation, electricity seller investing non-cooperation, technology cooperation and full cooperation. Stackelberg game, backward induction and symbolic computation methods are used to solve the equilibrium results, and the sensitivity of key parameters is analyzed by numerical experiments. The results show that complete cooperation can increase the investment level by 37.98% and the total profit of the system by 43.18% compared with the non-cooperation led by power producers. When the price of green certificate rises, the investment in scenario 3 increases by 34.1%. After the increase of carbon trading price, the profit of power generators in scenario 3 will increase by about 26.1%. When the probability of intermittency increases, the profit of the generator in scenario 2 still rises from 4.82 to 7.48, reflecting the intensification of bargaining under the guaranteed supply advantage. This study can provide theoretical and decision-making significance for power enterprises to optimize green investment and cooperation contract design, and to improve policy portfolio.
